A matter of antitrust: the debate over the role of government as referee of market competition by David Van Den Berg & Stephen Slivinski
O
n May 12, 2009, Christine Varney, the assistant
attorney general of the Department of Justice’s
antitrust division, made a speech to the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce. She declared a renewed interest
by the federal government in pursuing more aggressive
action against companies with substantial market power.
“As antitrust enforcers, we cannot sit on the sidelines any
longer — both in terms of enforcing the antitrust laws and
contributing to sound competition policy as part of our
nation’s economic strategy.”
Varney, known for her career as a prominent Washington
attorney and member of the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) between 1994 and 1997, was referring to what she saw
as a neglect of the government’s role in policing some types
of corporate business activity. The last time the federal 
government actively pursued a number of high-profile
antitrust cases was in the 1990s. That period, however, was a
temporary change from the long-term decline in the number
of government-launched antitrust cases — a trend that
started as early as the 1970s.
The policy debate now hinges on assumptions about
whether the modern market economy is especially prone to
harming consumers or whether markets are vibrant enough
to punish firms that try to engage in anticompetitive behav-
ior. In other words, whether the government should play an
active role as a referee of competition in the marketplace. 
Economists and legal scholars have pondered these issues
for decades. While there is wide agreement that cartels
reduce consumer welfare and should be dismantled, they
have proven hard to maintain in a modern developed 
economy with low barriers to entry. Today, disagreement
instead exists over the ability of individual firms to act in a
near-monopolistic fashion. Whatever consensus has formed
on that issue, however, suggests that government might have
only a limited ability to improve on market outcomes.
The Evolution of Antitrust
The first U.S. antitrust statute was the Sherman Act of 1890.
It outlawed cartelization of industries — or, in the words of
the law, any “conspiracy” among multiple companies that
would result “in restraint of trade” — and monopolization.
The law didn’t really provide a working definition for either
of these concepts. It is, however, the statute that gives 
the power, in Section 2, to the government to pursue legal
action against a single firm acting as if it were a mono-
poly. (Modern-day antitrust actions tend to be Section 2
prosecutions.)
In 1914, Congress passed the Clayton Act and it served 
to clarify the Sherman Act. It went so far as to prohibit 
specific actions that were seen as anticompetitive, like
mergers that “substantially lessen competition.” The same
year saw the passage of the Federal Trade Commission Act
that created an executive branch agency able to launch
investigations and issue cease and desist orders to corpora-
tions engaged in what were considered unfair trade
practices. It also created a system by which private firms
could lodge complaints against their competitors and, if the
FTC deems it appropriate, trigger investigations of those
against which complaints were filed. After 1914, only a few
other laws have honed the scope of government action 
and the tools it can use to police competition in the 
marketplace. 
Yet, while policymakers and judges pondered what quali-
fied as competition-squelching business activity, economists
were largely silent in the policy debate for the next 30 years.
While most scorned the Sherman Act and its subsequent
modifications, that’s usually as far as they went. “At best, the
statute seemed a harmless measure incapable of halting an
irresistible trend toward firms of larger scale and scope,”
write George Washington University law professor William
Kovacic and University of California, Berkeley economist
Carl Shapiro in the Journal of Economic Perspectives. 
An era of aggressive governmental action against 
businesses, particularly in the realm of corporate mergers,
began in the mid-1930s. A number of major antitrust deci-
sions breaking up companies and hindering mergers handed
down by the Supreme Court and lower courts continued
generally unabated until the 1970s. The lopsided nature of
the case law that emerged from this period even spurred
Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart to describe the era’s
merger decisions in a 1966 opinion by a simple formulation:
“The government always wins.”
By the early 1970s, economists and legal scholars based
largely at the University of Chicago — among them current
federal judge Richard Posner, former judge Robert Bork,
and economist George Stigler — began to counter the level
of activism present in court rulings. “The Chicago School
approach used the tools of microeconomics to explain 
business arrangements with an eye toward carefully under-
standing the markets and institutions within which the
arrangements were generated,” says George Mason
University law professor Joshua Wright. 
This was a contrast from the legal consensus at the time
that applied the notion of “per se illegality” in antitrust
cases. This meant that certain business practices were by
definition a violation of the law regardless of the justifica-
tion for the arrangement or its effect on consumers. As Bork
described it his seminal book on the Chicago approach, 
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 The Antitrust Paradox, published in 1978: “Behavior is illegal
per se when the plaintiff need prove only that it occurred in
order to win his case, there being no other elements to the
offense and no allowable defense.” A good example — and
one that would still be prosecuted today on this same basis
— is the behavior engaged in by members of a cartel.
In most cases, the Chicago School critics argued that a
better standard was one that eventually became known 
as the “rule of reason” — a real-world assessment in which
market realities and corporate structures are to be viewed in
light of actual outcomes. Bork describes this as being
“judged by the standards of the party’s intent or the effect
his behavior was likely to have, considering the market 
context.”
An example would be a large firm that has high fixed
costs but passes along lower prices to consumers if they are
able to spread the costs over a larger base of customers.
When judgments based on per se illegality were the norm,
the mere fact that this firm is so large and dominated such a
large share of the customer base might be enough to spark a
legal rebuke and a stiff penalty. 
The Chicago School analysts would point out that a large
firm’s presence might actually make consumers better off
relative to its absence. That consideration, they argued,
should be the focus of antitrust
analysis. Indeed, Bork suggested
that the “only legitimate goal of
antitrust is the maximization of con-
sumer welfare.” 
A related concern was whether
increased action by government to
punish firms for what was perceived
as anticompetitive behavior might
stifle market innovation. In such a
scenario, new business arrangements
that merely ran the risk of running
afoul of an ill-defined legal standard
might never see the light of day and
consequently make consumers
worse off in the aggregate. 
The Chicago approach gained
prominence just as economists start-
ed to take a greater role in antitrust
jurisprudence. Involvement of econ-
omists in the practice of antitrust
law reached its current peak in the
1980s and 1990s when economists —
particularly those with a Chicago
School bent — were appointed to
prominent positions with the FTC.
Today the broad consensus in
antitrust law has been defined by
economists or legal scholars with
substantial economics training.
“Most commentators, even those
who are now critical of the Chicago
School contribution to antitrust economics, agree that the
Chicago School dramatically improved the state of affairs,”
says Wright. 
AQuestion of Market Power 
The thinking in modern antitrust circles that supports a
more activist role for government goes like this: A firm 
doesn’t need to be the only provider of a good to damage
competition — it merely needs to be the dominant firm in
that market and act as if it was a monopoly by exercising its
“market power.” That could potentially result in behavior
that reduces consumer welfare and drives out competition.
Straightforward as this may seem, it’s often a difficult 
situation to identify in practice. “Monopolization is the
most vexing problem for antitrust lawyers precisely because
it is so difficult to confidently and accurately identify and
distinguish conduct that will help consumers from conduct
that might harm them,” says Wright. 
To prove a firm’s dominant power, the first task is to
define the scope of the relevant market, both geographi-
cally and in terms of which products are considered substi-
tutes within that defined market. Then the general rule is to
determine whether a company could increase the price of 
its product by 5 percent without losing profit. According 
to standard antitrust legal defini-
tions, being able to do so would
indicate the existence of a firm with
monopoly-like power.
But defining the relevant size of
the market is tricky and fraught with
peril. “There’s a tendency for the
Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission to push
for definitions of the market that in
hindsight look to be inappropriately
narrow,” says William Shughart, a
professor of economics at the
University of Mississippi who served
as an economist at the FTC from
1979 to 1983.
Arecent example is the debate in
2007 around the merger of the
supermarket chains Whole Foods
and Wild Oats, both of which spe-
cialized in selling organic produce
and food products. The FTC chal-
lenged the merger on the grounds
that it would create a firm that was
much too dominant in its relevant
market. But Shughart notes that the
FTC was defining the relevant 
market as existing mainly of the two
specialty chains in question. “The
market is probably much wider than
that and might include all grocery
stores, many of whom at the time
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1890
Sherman Antitrust Act
The first federal antitrust law. Prohibits agreements that




Designed to clarify the Sherman Act. It specifically 
outlaws certain actions like “tying” and mergers that
substantially decrease competition. 
1914
Federal Trade Commission Act 
Established the independent regulatory agency tasked
with enforcing antitrust statutes. 
1936
Robinson-Patman Act
An amendment to the Clayton Act. It allows the govern-
ment to penalize firms for practicing “price
discrimination” — the act of charging different prices 
to similar buyers — if such discrimination decreases
competition. 
1976
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act 
This law requires companies to furnish the Federal
Trade Commission and Department of Justice with
information about large mergers and acquisitions
before they occur. A mandated waiting period applies
to each merger to allow the federal government to
investigate the effects it might have on competition.
A Short Guide to Major 
Antitrust Statutes
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were beginning to introduce sections devoted to carrying
organic consumer products.” 
Coming up with an answer to the question of how to
define the scope of a market also suffers from a potentially
insurmountable information problem. “Rarely in an
antitrust case do the economists on either side have all the
data that they would like to have to help them develop a
sound market definition,” says Shughart. 
In the meantime, as the economy becomes more com-
plex and barriers to competition fall, economists note it
becomes difficult to make the case that most firms can
maintain any sort of monopoly pricing power they might
have for very long. The market can provide a check on
behavior that might be anticompetitive or harm consumers.
The risk of rival firms entering the market and offering
lower prices or better service and products could be enough
to discipline the incumbent firm if the barriers to entry in a
market are low enough.        
Fit to be Tied?
Another business practice that antitrust enforcers look to 
as evidence of anticompetitive behavior are “tying” or
“bundling” arrangements. That’s when a company makes the
purchase of one of its products conditional on the purchase
of another. Tying is seen by some antitrust scholars as 
reducing consumer welfare because it inhibits competition
in related goods. Such was the basis of the Justice
Department’s case against Microsoft in the late 1990s. 
The Department of Justice and the FTC alleged that the
company had monopoly power over certain types of 
personal computing platforms because it required the pur-
chase and installation of its Internet browser on any
computer that also ran Windows, its operating system.  
Yet the existence of bundles is more prevalent than 
many people realize. In fact, it’s quite plausible they are so
prevalent for a good reason. To explain this reality, the
Chicago School critics of antitrust have long sought to inject
into the discussion of antitrust analysis a real-world under-
standing of the corporate arrangements and pricing
structures that allow new products to be brought to market. 
One reason tying arrangements might persist is that they
enhance the ability of companies to create new markets
through the cross-subsidization of two products. Usually
this occurs when a good with high costs to produce is paired
with another good that is relatively cheap to produce.
Prohibiting a tying arrangement — or a flat price for selling
the two goods bundled together — might result in a decline
in consumer welfare. The cross-subsidy might, at least in 
the short term, be the only way for the firm to efficiently 
provide the product. 
Pondering whether a tying arrangement might be a drag
on competition, however, can become a “metaphysical” task,
writes Bork. “Every person who sells anything imposes a
tying arrangement. This is true because every product or
service could be broken down into smaller components
capable of being sold separately, and every seller either 
refuses at some point to break the product down any further
or, what comes to the same thing, charges a proportionally
higher price for the smaller unit.” 
Bork uses the examples of a car dealer who refuses to sell
a customer only the automobile chassis or a grocer who sells
the pears and the can they are stored in together for one
price. Giving the courts broad latitude to determine
whether one product or two is being sold would put judges
in the position of “determining an efficient way to run 
a business, a subject in which they have little expertise,” 
he writes.
Incidentally, Robert Bork shocked many of his colleagues
and admirers when he favored the government’s action
against Microsoft in 1998. By his reasoning, those tying
agreements were enough to squelch competition in the
browser market. It was a controversial argument at the time,
not least because it seemed to contradict his earlier writings
on the subject. Many noted that rival browsers already 
existed and could compete with Microsoft’s product. Today,
in a world where browser competition is lively and techno-
logical innovation is rapid, it may seem quaint to think that
a single company would be able to dominate for long — or
that a judge would be able to accurately predict the future
course of the market, the optimal arrangement of firms
within a specific industry, or the rationality of a business
decision.
Costly Errors and Political Influence
In antitrust enforcement, like any area of life, errors can and
do occur. When antitrust enforcers make mistakes, those
errors could be quite costly to the economy and to consumer
welfare. 
There are two types of errors to consider. False positives
occur when judges mistakenly impose penalties on firms
that are engaged in practices which don’t actually 
constitute anticompetitive behavior. False negatives occur
when actual anticompetitive practices are not punished.  
As Wright points out, “it is well accepted that false 
positives are more costly than false negatives.” That’s
because mistakenly punishing a firm also eliminates the con-
tribution it was making to consumer welfare. When
decisions handed down by a court can include measures as
extreme as ordering the breakup of a company perceived to
be acting as a monopolist, you can see how consumers would
be worse off if you assume that the composition of existing
firms is rational in an economic sense. The redistribution of
the market shares would lead to an economic loss.   
Conversely, as Northwestern University law professor
Fred McChesney writes in a 2003 issue of the Emory Law
Journal, false negatives will have a less severe long-term
impact so long as entry barriers into markets are low. 
“As prices rise because of anticompetitive contracts or 
practices, new entrants emerge to alleviate or even eradicate
the problem,” he notes. The error of inaction on the part of
courts is actually “a self-correcting problem,” McChesney
writes. The question then becomes whether the antitrust system
is more prone to the costly type of errors. And some econo-
mists view antitrust enforcement as not just error-prone —
they see it as the product of a system that can also be gamed,
thereby increasing the odds that costly errors occur. “There
is a great deal of political influence on the process which is
instigated by competitors of the firms that have a big stake
in the outcome,” says Shughart.
Recall that individual firms can lodge complaints against
their business rivals through the FTC, and this opens up the
door to using the government as a tool to beat up on their
competition. “Antitrust enforcers must be very skeptical of
claims brought by competitors against one another and do a
much more thorough investigation in those cases than they
might otherwise do to rule out the possibility the initial
complaint was just self-serving,” notes Shughart. 
He also points out that there is substantial evidence to
show that competitors of defendant companies in antitrust
cases are the main beneficiaries. This “abuse of antitrust,” as
New York University economics professors William Baumol
and Janusz Ordover characterized it in the Journal of Law 
& Economics, comes with costs that might well exceed any 
pro-competitive benefits of antitrust law. 
This concern has its roots in the Chicago School critique
as well. George Stigler made the case that regulatory 
agencies — especially those vested with the power to punish
companies — risk being “captured” by the businesses they
are supposed to regulate. When government has the power
to determine when there are too few firms in an industry,
every firm in the industry will vie to influence the decisions
of the regulatory body and attempt to use regulation for 
private rather than public benefit. 
The Future of Antitrust
What used to be known as the Chicago approach might now
be more aptly described as the modern consensus. Daniel
Crane, a law professor at the University of Michigan Law
School, has noted that, at least for the time being, noninter-
vention is the default assumption among antitrust judges.
There are criticisms to this consensus from a new 
breed of legal scholars and some economists. These “post-
Chicago” scholars, while acknowledging the importance of
the neoclassical model for developing coherence in antitrust
policy, have launched critiques of some of the assumptions
of the consensus. The result is advocacy of a more activist
approach to antitrust and making the case for when more
extensive government intervention may be justified.  
One key difference between the Chicago School and 
its critics is the concern that the market won’t react quickly
enough to discipline dominant firms. “Competition is 
a public good,” argues Jonathan Baker, an American
University law professor and former head of the FTC’s
Bureau of Economics from 1995 to 1998, in a 2003 article in
the Journal of Economic Perspectives. Over the long term, rival
firms may arise to compete with the dominant firm. But 
it won’t happen quickly and in the interim the costs to 
consumers will be too high.  
Nevertheless, judicial and academic consensuses are hard
to dislodge in the short term. Any activist enforcement of
antitrust statutes will likely meet resistance from a judiciary
steeped in the Chicago approach. 
Besides, antitrust cases take a long time to prepare,
Shughart says. That means it may take years before a 
governmenzt case sees the light of day. Yet, many years is a
lifetime in a rapidly changing and innovative economy, notes
Shughart, “and what the market looks like after the case is
brought will be completely different from what it looked
like when they started.” Any company that seems to have
dominant market share today may not have such market
power years later — or, for that matter, exist at all.
So the most significant problem for a more activist
antitrust enforcement may not come from any particular
academic discipline or school of thought. Instead, it may
come from the simple reality of a fast-changing modern
economy — characterized by technological advancement
and generally lower barriers to entry.  RF
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